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 3 
 Átruházható hasznosságú játékok 
bizonytalansággal 
Habis Helga - P. Jean-Jacques Herings 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Bevezetjük a TUU-játék fogalmát, azaz az átruházható hasznosságú játékot 
bizonytalansággal. Egy TUU-játékban a koalíciók kifizetése bizonytalan. A véges számú 
világállapotok közül egy megvalósul, és a világállapottól függően a játékosok egy bizonyos 
átruházható hasznosságú játékban vesznek részt. Az ex ante kötelezettségvállalási 
lehetőségek nélküli esetet vizsgáljuk és a gyenge szekvenciális magot javasoljuk ennek 
megoldására. Karakterizáljuk a gyenge szekvenciális magot és megmutatjuk, hogy nem 
üres, ha az összes ex post TUU-játék konvex. 
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mag 
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Transferable Utility Games with Uncertainty
Helga Habis∗ and P. Jean-Jacques Herings†
April 8, 2011
Abstract
We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with un-
certainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions.
One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the
state, the players are involved in a particular transferable utility game. We consider
the case without ex ante commitment possibilities and propose the Weak Sequential
Core as a solution concept. We characterize the Weak Sequential Core and show that
it is non-empty if all ex post TU-games are convex.
Keywords: transferable utility games, uncertainty, Weak Sequential Core
JEL Classification: C71, C73
1 Introduction
The vast majority of cooperative game theory has focused on games with deterministic pay-
offs. Nevertheless, uncertainty plays an inevitable role in most surplus sharing problems.
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In this paper we introduce transferable utility games with uncertainty, called TUU-games.
A TUU-game consists of two time periods, 0 and 1. Period 0 is a time period before the
resolution of uncertainty. In period 1 one out of a finite number of states of nature mate-
rializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular transferable
utility game. An allocation therefore specifies a payoff to each player conditional on each
possible state of nature. A utility function is then used to assign a utility level to each
profile of state-contingent payoffs.
This new set-up provides a more general treatment of uncertainty than the approach
that has appeared in the literature so far. Granot (1977) introduced a cooperative game
where the values of the coalitions are random variables with given distribution functions,
and players are risk-neutral. This treatment is less complete since it specifies only the
marginal distribution of the worths of coalitions, whereas our approach allows for the
complete specification of the distribution, implying that for instance correlation between
the worths of several coalitions can be incorporated. Suijs and Borm (1999) and Suijs,
Borm, De Waegenaere, and Tijs (1999) no longer assume risk neutrality, but keep the
specification where only marginal distributions of worths are given. Bossert, Derks, and
Peters (2005) consider a pair of TU-games, one of which will be the true game. They
do not use utility functions but perform a worst-case analysis. Closest to our set-up
is Predtetchinski (2007), where the non-transferable utility case is studied in an infinite
horizon setting. His approach is similar to ours in the sense that the game to be played is
determined by the particular realization of the state of nature.
The introduction of uncertainty into cooperative games raises many new and interesting
issues. When players can make state-contingent agreements before the resolution of uncer-
tainty, i.e. at the ex ante stage, period 0, the situation boils down to a non-transferable
utility game, and we can apply for instance the classical concept of the Core to determine
allocations of payoffs that are stable.
We, on the contrary, are interested in the case where no binding agreements are possible
before the state of nature is known, but where players have the option to discuss agreements
in period 0. Lacking the possibility to make binding agreements concerning the ex post
stage, period 1, such agreements have to be self-enforcing. Our motivation for period 0 is
thereby similar to the one underlying the notion of Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium, where
players discuss the strategies they are going to use, but cannot make binding commitments,
and their choices have to be self-enforcing. After the resolution of uncertainty in period 1,
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players know the TU-game that they play and can make binding commitments as is usual
in cooperative game theory.
A consequence of the absence of binding agreements in period 0 is that many ex ante
desirable transfers of payoffs across states are not feasible. Indeed, in the absence of binding
agreements in period 0, only allocations in the Core of the transferable utility game that
results after the state of nature is known, are self-enforcing.
Throughout the paper we assume symmetric information. There is also a rather exten-
sive literature on cooperation in economies with private information, where usually a third
stage between the ex ante and ex post stages is distinguished, namely an interim stage in
which the agents learn their private information. See for instance Vohra (1999) for a study
of the core in this framework. In these models, however, subject to incentive compatibility
constraints, a complete contracting environment results; for the special case of symmetric
information one is lead to the classical core. The study of asymmetric information issues in
an incomplete contracting framework remains an interesting subject for further research.
We are interested in the appropriate definition of the Core in a TUU-game. In this
setting coalitions are allowed to form in both periods. Stability requires that a suggested
allocation cannot be blocked by any coalition at any period, i.e. both before and after
the resolution of uncertainty. We concentrate on agreements which are self-enforcing in
the sense that a coalition can only deviate from a given allocation if no sub-coalition ever
has a credible counter-deviation. Ray (1989) shows that in a static environment the set
of deviations coincides with the set of credible deviations. This is no longer true in our
setting, and leads to the solution concept of the Weak Sequential Core.
The Weak Sequential Core was introduced in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) for finite
deterministic sequences of TU-games, and it was defined for two-period exchange economies
with incomplete markets in Predtetchinski, Herings, and Perea (2006). In Kranich, Perea,
and Peters (2005) the Weak Sequential Core was defined as the set of feasible payoff
allocations for the grand coalition, from which no coalition ever has a credible deviation.
In Habis and Herings (2010) it is demonstrated that the definition of credibility in Kranich,
Perea, and Peters (2005) has to be adapted in order to show that the Weak Sequential
Core has a nice characterization in terms of the cores of appropriately defined subgames. In
Predtetchinski, Herings, and Perea (2006) this characterization was used as the definition
of the Weak Sequential Core in a two-period exchange economy; i.e. the issue of the
credibility of deviations is neglected there.
3
We extend the notion of credible deviation of Habis and Herings (2010) to TUU-games
and show that an allocation belongs to the Weak Sequential Core only if conditional on the
state of nature it belongs to the Core of the related ex post TU-game. This result follows
from the absence of credible deviations in period 1. The absence of credible deviations in
period 0 is then used to show that an allocation belongs to the Weak Sequential Core if
moreover there is no coalition in period 0 that can propose state-contingent Core elements
of the ex post games restricted to that coalition, which gives each of its members higher
expected utility. In this way we obtain a characterization of the Weak Sequential Core.
This characterization is in the spirit of the one proposed by Kranich, Perea, and Peters
(2005) and later proved properly by Habis and Herings (2010), extended to the case with
uncertainty.
A problem of the Weak Sequential Core concept is that the existing literature has
failed to provide a general non-emptiness result, whereas moreover both Kranich, Perea,
and Peters (2005) and Predtetchinski, Herings, and Perea (2006) give examples where
the Weak Sequential Core is empty. We provide a general result on the non-emptiness
of the Weak Sequential Core of TUU-games. We show that if all the ex post TU-games
are convex, then the Weak Sequential Core is non-empty. This result does not impose any
assumptions on the utility functions of the players beyond continuity and state-separability.
We also provide examples to show that the convexity condition cannot be weakened to
permutational convexity, not even when the permutation is the same for all ex post TU-
games, nor can it be weakened to exactness.
The outline of the paper is as follows. We specify the model in Section 2 and give the
formal definition of the Weak Sequential Core in Section 3, followed by its characterization
in Section 4. We show the non-emptiness result in Section 5 and present the examples
showing that permutational convexity or exactness are not sufficient for non-emptiness.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a game with two time periods, t ∈ T = {0, 1}. Period 0 corresponds to an ex
ante stage before the resolution of uncertainty. In period 1 one state s out of a finite set
of states of nature {1, . . . , S} occurs. Since no confusion can arise, we also denote this
set by S. We define the state of nature for period 0 as state 0, so the set of all states is
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S ′ = {0} ∪ S. In period 1 the players are involved in a cooperative game with transferable
utility, or briefly TU-game, where the game itself is allowed to be state-dependent.
The TU-game Γs played in state s ∈ S is a pair (N, vs), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
is the set of players and vs : 2
N → R is a characteristic function which assigns to each
coalition C ⊂ N its worth vs(C), with the convention that vs(∅) = 0. The collection of
non-empty subsets of N is denoted by N , so N = 2N \ {∅}. Player i ∈ N evaluates his
payoffs by a utility function ui : RS → R, which assigns to every profile of payoffs xi =
(xi1, . . . , x
i
S) ∈ RS a utility level ui(xi). The utility function is assumed to be continuous
and state-separable, i.e. ui(xi) =
∑
s∈S u
i
s(x
i
s), where u
i
s(x
i
s) is monotonically increasing.
Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions are a prominent example of utility functions
satisfying these assumptions.
A TU-game with uncertainty is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. A TU-game with uncertainty (TUU-game) Γ is a tuple (N,S, v, u) where
v = (v1, . . . , vS) are state-dependent characteristic functions and u = (u
1, . . . , un) are
utility functions.
Note that there are no payoffs in state 0. State 0 is merely introduced as a point in
time when the players face the uncertainty in the future and may decide to agree upon
future state-contingent payoff allocations. Payoffs in state 0 could be incorporated into
our model but our main interest is to get insight into the effect of future uncertainty on
the stability of payoff allocations.
Another observation is that when the cardinality of S is one, the concept of a TUU-
game collapses with the one of a TU-game. In the absence of uncertainty, all monotonic
transformations of utility functions are equivalent, and it is without loss of generality to
take ui(xi) = xi. Our interest is obviously in the cases with non-degenerate uncertainty.
The central question in a TUU-game is how the worth vs(N) of the grand coalition is
distributed among its members in every state s ∈ S. A distribution of worth, represented
by a matrix x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ RS×N , is called an allocation. The state-s component
xs = (x
1
s, . . . , x
n
s ) ∈ RN of an allocation is referred to as the allocation in state s ∈ S.
The total worth obtained by coalition C in state s is xs(C) =
∑
i∈C x
i
s. An allocation for
a coalition C is a matrix xC = (xi)i∈C ∈ RS×C , with a state-s component xCs ∈ RC . The
restriction of a TUU-game Γ to coalition C is a TUU-game itself and is denoted by (Γ, C).
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3 The Weak Sequential Core
We study which allocations in the game Γ are stable. In general, x¯ is stable if there is no
state s′ ∈ S ′ and no coalition C ⊂ N which has a profitable deviation from x¯ at state s′.
There are various ways in which the notion of profitable deviation might be formulated.
Here we concentrate on the Weak Sequential Core, introduced in Kranich, Perea, and Peters
(2005) for finite deterministic sequences of TU-games and in Predtetchinski, Herings, and
Perea (2006) for two-period exchange economies with incomplete markets. Here we define
the Weak Sequential Core for TUU-games.
When the classical definition of the Core (Gillies, 1959) is adapted to situations with
time and uncertainty, it is typically assumed that agents can fully commit to any state-
contingent allocation. In this case one would define the set of feasible allocations for a
coalition C ⊂ N as
XC = {xC ∈ RS×C | xC(C) ≤ v(C)},
resulting in the set of utilities for coalition C given by
V (C) = {u¯C ∈ RC | ∃xC ∈ XC , ∀i ∈ C, u¯i = ui(xi)},
thereby obtaining an NTU-game. Full commitment may be a strong and unrealistic as-
sumption in the presence of time and uncertainty. Once the state of nature is known, there
are typically players which have no incentives to stick to the previously arranged allocation
of payoffs. Here we analyze the case with absence of commitments and look for agreements
which are self-enforcing.
First we define what allocations, and thereby deviations, are feasible for coalitions at
different states, then we formalize the notion of credible deviations and finally we define
the Weak Sequential Core of a TUU-game. We start with feasibility at future states.
Definition 3.1. Fix some allocation x¯. The allocation xC is feasible for coalition C at
state s ∈ S given x¯ if
xC−s = x¯
C
−s,
xCs (C) ≤ vs(C).
The first condition requires that the members of a coalition take allocations outside
state s as given. Since utility functions are assumed to be state-separable, this assumption
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is harmless. According to the second condition, in state s the members of a coalition can
redistribute at most their worth.
We turn next to feasibility as state 0.
Definition 3.2. The allocation xC is feasible for a coalition C at state 0 if
xC(C) ≤ v(C).
Note that feasibility at state 0 requires that the allocation must be feasible for coalition
C in every state; it requires
∑
i∈C x
i
s ≤ vs(C) to hold for all states s in period 1.
We continue by defining deviations as feasible allocations that improve the utility of
every coalition member.
Definition 3.3. Fix some allocation x¯. A coalition C can deviate from x¯ at state s′ ∈ S ′
if there exists a feasible allocation xC for C at s′ given x¯ such that
ui(xi) > ui(x¯i), for all i ∈ C.
The allocation xC in Definition 3.3 is referred to as a deviation. Definition 3.3 can be
extended in an obvious way to define deviations from an allocation xC by a sub-coalition
D of C.
We show in the following example that deviations are not necessarily self-enforcing.
Example 3.4. Consider a TUU-game with two players and with two states in period 1
with equal probability of occurrence. The players are assumed to be strictly risk-averse
expected utility maximizers. Let the state-dependent characteristic function be the fol-
lowing: v1({1, 2}) = v2({1, 2}) = 1, v1({1}) = v2({2}) = 1, v1({2}) = v2({1}) = 0. The
characteristic function has the feature that player i does not contribute to the surplus at
state s = −i.
Let the allocation
x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2) =
(
1 0
0 1
)
be given. Now consider the allocation
x = (x1, x2) =
(
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
)
,
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which is feasible for the grand coalition in state 0. Since both players are risk-averse, x is
a deviation from x¯ at state 0 by coalition {1, 2}.
The allocation x is not self-enforcing though, since after the resolution of uncertainty
it will always be blocked by a singleton coalition; at state 1 player 1 can block x11 =
1
2
by
xˆ11 = v1({1}) = 1 and at state 2 player 2 can block x22 = 12 by xˆ22 = v2({2}) = 1.
Since deviations should be self-enforcing, we introduce the notion of credible deviations.
In defining credibility, we follow the approach developed in Ray (1989) for the static case.
Ray (1989) shows that in a static environment the set of deviations coincides with the set
of credible deviations. This is no longer true in our setting.
Credible deviations are defined recursively and by backwards induction. At any future
state, any deviation by a singleton coalition is credible. A two-player coalition has a
credible deviation at a future state if there is no singleton sub-coalition with a credible
counter-deviation at that state. A credible deviation at a future state for an arbitrary
coalition is then defined by recursion. More formally, a recursive definition of a credible
deviation at state s ∈ S by a coalition C is as follows.
Definition 3.5. Fix some allocation x¯. Any deviation xC from x¯ at state s ∈ S by a
singleton coalition is credible. Suppose credible deviations have been defined for each
coalition of size k. Let C be a coalition of size k + 1. A deviation xC from x¯ at state s
by coalition C is credible if there is no sub-coalition D ( C such that D has a credible
deviation from xC at state s.
At state 0, again, any deviation by a singleton coalition is credible. A two-player
coalition has a credible deviation at state 0 if there is no singleton sub-coalition with a
credible counter-deviation at any state, current or future. A credible deviation at state 0
by an arbitrary coalition is then defined by recursion. More formally, we have the following
definition.
Definition 3.6. Fix some allocation x¯. Any deviation xC from x¯ at state 0 by a singleton
coalition is credible. Suppose credible deviations have been defined for each coalition of
size k. Let C be a coalition of size k + 1. A deviation xC from x¯ at state 0 by coalition C
is credible if there is no sub-coalition D ( C and state s′ ∈ S ′ such that D has a credible
deviation from xC at s′.
Definition 3.7. The Weak Sequential Core WSC(Γ) of the game Γ is the set of feasible
allocations x¯ for the grand coalition from which no coalition ever has a credible deviation.
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Our definition of the Weak Sequential Core is different from the one in Kranich, Perea,
and Peters (2005) and the one in Predtetchinski, Herings, and Perea (2006). Kranich,
Perea, and Peters (2005) do not require the counter-deviation by a sub-coalition to be
credible, which leads to problems as demonstrated in Habis and Herings (2010). We adapt
the definition in Habis and Herings (2010) to TUU-games. The definition of the Weak
Sequential Core in Predtetchinski, Herings, and Perea (2006) for an incomplete markets
exchange economy is based directly on the characterization we present in Theorem 4.4.
We would also like to point out the similarity of our recursive definition to the one used in
the concept of Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987).
In both cases the notion of self-enforcement is interpreted as the absence of deviating sub-
coalitions, where the recursive approach guarantees consistency of this notion.
Example 3.4 (continued). We show that x¯ is the only allocation which belongs to the
Weak Sequential Core of the game. For an allocation x to belong to the Weak Sequential
Core, it must hold that x11 ≥ 1, since otherwise player 1 could credibly block x in state 1
by xˆ11 = v1({1}) = 1. An analogous reasoning implies that x21 ≥ 0. Similarly, x22 ≥ 1 must
hold, since otherwise player 2 could credibly block x in state 2 by xˆ22 = v2({2}) = 1, and by
analogous reasons we have x12 ≥ 0. Now it follows from feasibility for the grand coalition
that x¯ is the only candidate element of WSC(Γ).
Clearly, singleton coalitions cannot deviate from x¯ at any state. The same is obviously
true for the grand coalition at any future state. The arguments already used to derive that
x¯ is the only candidate as a Weak Sequential Core element, imply that the grand coalition
does not have a credible deviation from x¯ at state 0.
4 Characterization
In this section we provide a useful characterization for the Weak Sequential Core. Consider
a particular credible deviation at state 0 by some coalition. We show that the set consisting
of all credible deviations which improve the utility of all coalition members by the same
amount or more is a compact set.
Lemma 4.1. Let x¯ be a feasible allocation and let xˆC be a credible deviation from x¯ at
state 0 by a coalition C of size greater than or equal to two. Let X be the set of credible
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deviations xC from x¯ at state 0 by coalition C such that ui(xi) ≥ ui(xˆi) for all i ∈ C. Then
the set X is compact.
Proof. First we show that X is closed. Consider a sequence (xCm)m∈N with x
C
m ∈ X
converging to x˜C . We need to show that x˜C ∈ X, so
(i) x˜C is a credible deviation from x¯ at state 0 by C,
(ii) ui(x˜i) ≥ ui(xˆi) for all i ∈ C.
The continuity of ui implies ui(x˜i) ≥ ui(xˆi) for all i ∈ C, thus (ii) holds.
Clearly, x˜C is a deviation from x¯ at state 0 by C, so if x˜C is not a credible deviation
then there is a credible deviation yD from x˜C at s′ ∈ S ′ by a sub-coalition D ( C. Since
ui(x˜i) < ui(yi) for all i ∈ D there must be an mˆ such that if m > mˆ then for all i ∈ D,
ui(xim) < u
i(yi). This makes yD a credible deviation from xCm at state s
′ by coalition D, a
contradiction, so (i) holds. Hence, X is closed.
Now we show that X is bounded. For all xC ∈ X it holds that
xi ≥ v({i}), i ∈ C,
since no player in C should have a credible deviation from xC at any s ∈ S. Therefore X is
bounded from below. Since xC(C) ≤ v(C), it follows that X is also bounded from above.
2
Note that Lemma 4.1 is not true for the set of deviations rather then the set of credible
deviations, since in the case of deviations it might be possible to compensate arbitrarily
negative payoffs in one state by sufficiently high positive payoffs in other states. For the
same reason, Lemma 4.1 is not true for singleton coalitions, since for these coalitions
deviations and credible deviations coincide.
Our characterization of the Weak Sequential Core makes use of the classical notion of
the Core of a TU-game.
Definition 4.2. A coalition C can improve upon an allocation x¯ in a TU-game (N, v) if
x¯(C) < v(C).
Definition 4.3. The Core C(N, v) of a TU-game (N, v) is the collection of allocations x¯
such that x¯(N) = v(N) and there is no coalition C that can improve upon x¯.
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The Weak Sequential Core can be characterized by means of the Core of suitably chosen
subgames.
Theorem 4.4. The following two statements are equivalent:
(a) x¯ ∈ WSC(Γ),
(b) x¯ is such that x¯s ∈ C(Γs) for all s ∈ S, and there is no C ⊂ N and allocation xC
such that xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S, and ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for all i ∈ C.
Proof.
(a) ⇒ (b). Consider some state s ∈ S and suppose there is a coalition C ⊂ N that can
improve upon x¯s by x
C
s . We define x
C
−s = x¯
C
−s. Either x
C is a credible deviation from x¯
at state s by coalition C or there is a sub-coalition D ( C such that D has a credible
deviation yD from xC at s. In the latter case yD is also a credible deviation from x¯ at state
s by coalition D. In both cases we have a contradiction with x¯ ∈WSC(Γ). It follows that
x¯s ∈ C(Γs).
Suppose there is C ⊂ N and xC such that xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S, and ui(xi) >
ui(x¯i) for all i ∈ C. We show that if such a deviation exists then there also exists a credible
deviation, thereby contradicting (a). If xC is a credible deviation from x¯ at 0 by C, then
we are done, so suppose this is not the case. Since xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) holds for all s ∈ S, there
cannot be a credible deviation from xC at s ∈ S by some coalition D ( C, so there must
be a credible deviation yD from xC at state 0 by some coalition D ( C. But then yD is
also a a credible deviation from x¯ at state 0 by D since ui(yi) > ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for all i ∈ D.
(b)⇒ (a). Suppose (a) does not hold. Since x¯s ∈ C(Γs) for all s ∈ S, no coalition has a
credible deviation from x¯ at s ∈ S and so there must be a credible deviation xˆC from x¯ at
state 0 by a coalition C. We will show that then there also exists a credible deviation x˜C
from x¯ at state 0 by coalition C such that x˜Cs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S, thereby violating
(b). When C contains a single player, say i, we define x˜Cs = vs({i}) for all s ∈ S and we
are done, so consider the case where C is of size greater than or equal to two.
Let X be the set of credible deviations xC from x¯ at state 0 by C with the property
that ui(xi) ≥ ui(xˆi) for all i ∈ C. Let x˜C be a solution of the problem
max
xC∈X
∑
i∈C
ui(xi). (1)
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Since the allocation xˆC belongs to X, X is non-empty. We know from Lemma 4.1 that X
is compact. Therefore the set of maximizers in (1) is non-empty.
We show that x˜Cs belongs to C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S. Suppose there exists a state s ∈ S
for which x˜Cs /∈ C(Γs, C). Then there is a coalition D ⊂ C that can improve upon x˜Cs by
means of yDs  x˜Cs . We define the allocation yD by setting yD−s = x˜C−s. Since x˜C is a credible
deviation from x¯, either D = C or D ( C and there is a proper sub-coalition of D with
a credible counter-deviation from yD at state s. The latter credible counter-deviation is a
credible deviation from x˜C at state s, a contradiction. It follows that D = C.
We show that yC belongs to X. By the separability of the utility function it holds that
ui(yi) > ui(x˜i) ≥ ui(xˆi) for all i ∈ C. Moreover, since x˜C is a credible deviation from x¯ at
state 0 by C and yCs ≥ x˜Cs for all s ∈ S, we have that yC is a credible deviation from x¯ at
state 0 by C, and it follows that yC ∈ X.
We have that
∑
i∈C u
i(yi) >
∑
i∈C u
i(x˜i), which contradicts that x˜C is a maximizer.
We have shown that x˜Cs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S. 2
For an allocation to belong to the Weak Sequential Core of the TUU-game Γ, the
allocation should belong to the Core of the TU-game Γs in every state s ∈ S. Moreover,
no coalition should be able to pick an element of the Core of the game restricted to C in
every state, and in doing so improve utility in an ex ante sense.
It follows immediately from Theorem 4.4 that the Weak Sequential Core of a TUU-game
with one state coincides with the Core of that game.
In a TUU-game one can distinguish ex ante and ex post efficiency.
Definition 4.5. An allocation x¯ is ex ante efficient in the game Γ if:
(i) x¯(N) = v(N).
(ii) There does not exist an allocation x with x(N) ≤ v(N) such that ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for
all i ∈ N .
Definition 4.6. An allocation x¯ is ex post efficient in the game Γ if x¯(N) = v(N).
Note, that the concept of ex post efficiency says more than the usual feasibility con-
ditions in TU-games, since it requires
∑
i∈N x¯
i
s = vs(N) to hold at all states s ∈ S, but
contrary to ex ante efficiency it does not imply Pareto-efficiency, since it does not consider
reallocation possibilities across states.
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Corollary 4.7. If x¯ ∈WSC(Γ), then x¯ is ex post efficient.
Observe that Example 3.4 demonstrates that an allocation in the Weak Sequential Core
might not be ex ante efficient.
5 Non-emptiness
Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) show that the Weak Sequential Core of a finite determin-
istic sequence of TU-games is non-empty if all utility functions are linear. Predtetchinski,
Herings, and Perea (2006) give sufficient conditions for non-emptiness for the case of an
exchange economy with two agents. These are the only results in the literature so far re-
garding non-emptiness of the Weak Sequential Core. Both papers present examples where
the Weak Sequential Core is empty.
The Weak Sequential Core can also be empty in a TUU-game, as shown in the following
example.
Example 5.1. Consider a TUU-game Γ with three players and two future states, both
occurring with equal probability. The characteristic function v is presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Characteristic function
v ∅ {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
v1 0 5 50 10 140 20 140 150
v2 0 50 5 10 140 140 20 150
Players are strictly risk averse expected utility maximizers.
By Theorem 4.4 only allocations in the Core of Γ1 and Γ2 can be stable. The Core of
each of these TU-games consists of exactly one vector:
C(Γ1) = {(10, 130, 10)},
C(Γ2) = {(130, 10, 10)}.
The resulting allocation
x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2, x¯3) =
(
10 130 10
130 10 10
)
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leads to high uncertainty for players 1 and 2, which could be completely eliminated if they
cooperated. Coalition {1, 2} can credibly deviate from x¯ by perfectly pooling their risks
at state 0, using
x{1,2} = (x1, x2) =
(
70 70
70 70
)
,
and so achieving a higher utility, since both players are strictly risk-averse expected utility
maximizers. We have shown that WSC(Γ) = ∅.
We show next that if Γs is convex for all s ∈ S, then the Weak Sequential Core is
non-empty. Notice that in Example 5.1 convexity is violated for both Γ1 and Γ2.
Definition 5.2. A TU-game (N, v) is convex if for all C ⊂ N and for all S ( T ⊂ N\C
it holds that v(S ∪ C)− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ C)− v(T ).
Theorem 5.3. Let the TUU-game Γ be such that Γs is convex for all s ∈ S. Then
WSC(Γ) 6= ∅.
Proof. Let pi : N → N be a permutation, assigning rank number pi(i) to any player
i ∈ N. For a player i ∈ N, we define pii = {j ∈ N | pi(j) ≤ pi(i)} as the set of predecessors
of player i. For every s ∈ S, the marginal vector mpi(Γs) ∈ RN is given by
mpi,i(Γs) = vs(pi
i)− vs(pii\{i}), i ∈ N,
and thus assigns to player i his marginal contribution to the worth of the coalition consisting
of all his predecessors in pi. We show that x¯ defined by x¯s = m
pi(Γs), s ∈ S, belongs to
WSC(Γ).
Since Γs is convex, it holds that x¯s ∈ C(Γs) for all s ∈ S (Shapley, 1971). Using
Theorem 4.4, it remains to be shown that there is no C ⊂ N and allocation xC such that
xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S, and ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for all i ∈ C.
Consider C ⊂ N and xC with xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S. Let i be the player in C
with the highest value of pi(i). It holds that
xis ≤ vs(C)− vs(C \ {i}) ≤ vs(pii)− vs(pii \ {i}) = x¯is,
where the first inequality follows since xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) and the second inequality since by the
choice of i as the highest ranked player in C according to pi it holds that C \ {i} ⊂ pii \ {i}
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and Γs is convex. By monotonicity of u
i we have that ui(xi) ≤ ui(x¯i), which completes the
proof. 2
In the proof of Theorem 5.3 we construct an allocation in the Weak Sequential Core by
fixing a permutation and allocating the payoffs in each state by means of the corresponding
marginal vector. Convexity of Γs implies that all marginal vectors belong to the Core of Γs.
Convexity is used once more to demonstrate that the highest ranked player in a deviating
coalition gets less payoff in each state than in the original allocation.
An interesting feature of Theorem 5.3 is that we do not need to make additional as-
sumptions on the utility functions of the players. Within the framework of expected utility,
we allow for both risk-averse and risk-loving players. Also many theories of non-expected
utility maximization are covered by our result. This is in contrast to the classical definition
of the Core, which might be empty-valued under the same assumptions. Considering the
lack of results on non-emptiness of the Weak Sequential Core in the literature so far, this
comes as a surprise.
The idea of fixing a certain permutation in the proof, might suggest that the convexity
assumption could be weakened to permutational convexity; i.e. assuming that each TU-
game Γs is permutationally convex with respect to the same permutation pi. Note however,
that this weaker assumption holds for the TUU-game presented in Example 5.1 for the
permutation pi = (3, 2, 1), whereas the Weak Sequential Core of that game is empty.
We show next that it is not possible to weaken convexity to exactness, a property
introduced in Schmeidler (1972).
Definition 5.4. A TU-game (N, v) is exact if for all C ⊂ N there exists a core allocation
x such that x(C) = v(C).
For TU-games with three players, the notion of convexity coincides with the one of
exactness. For games with more than three players, exactness is a weaker property. To
verify whether a game is exact, we use the notion of exact balancedness, introduced in
Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2011). For C ⊂ N, a(C) ∈ RN is the membership vector in C,
where ai(C) = 1 if i ∈ C and ai(C) = 0 otherwise.
Definition 5.5. An exactly balanced vector of weights is a vector (λC)C∈N such that
λD ∈ R for some D ∈ N , and λC ∈ R+ for all C 6= D, and
∑
C∈N λCa(C) = a(N).
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A TU-game (N, v) is exactly balanced if
∑
C∈N λCv(C) ≤ v(N) for all exactly balanced
vectors of weights.
The following result was shown in Cso´ka, Herings, and Ko´czy (2011).
Theorem 5.6. A TU-game (N, v) is exact if and only if it is exactly balanced.
The only difference to the condition of balancedness is that one weight, λD, is not
restricted to be non-negative. Since this creates an extra degree of freedom, the set of
exactly balanced vectors is larger than the set of balanced vectors, so the class of exactly
balanced games is a subset of the class of balanced games. Exact balancedness can also be
used to give any easy proof of the fact that the class of exactly balanced games is a subset
of the class of totally balanced games.
The following example shows that the Weak Sequential Core can be empty when all
the games Γs are exact.
Example 5.7. Consider a TUU-game Γ with five players and six future states, all occurring
with equal probability. All players are strictly risk-averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
maximizers. We consider the vectors w1 = (2, 1, 3, 0, 2) and w2 = (0, 5, 1, 2, 0), and we
define a TU-game (N,w) with N = {1, . . . , 5} by
w(C) = min{w1(C), w2(C)}, C ⊂ N.
We define the permutations pi1, . . . , pi6 by
pi1 = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), pi3 = (3, 1, 2, 4, 5), pi5 = (2, 3, 1, 4, 5),
pi2 = (1, 2, 3, 5, 4), pi4 = (3, 1, 2, 5, 4), pi6 = (2, 3, 1, 5, 4),
and, for s = 1, . . . , 6, we define the TU-game Γs = (N, vs) by setting
vs(C) = w(pis(C)), C ⊂ N,
resulting in a TUU-game Γ with five players and six states.
The TU-games (N, vs) are all obtained by renaming the players in the TU-game (N,w).
All properties derived for (N,w) thereby immediately carry over to the games (N, vs) by
taking appropriate permutations. We first analyze (N,w). We show that (N,w) is exact.
By Definition 5.5 we have to check exact balancedness. Consider a vector of balancing
weights (λC)C∈N . If all the balancing weights are non-negative, then∑
C∈N
λCw(C) ≤ min{
∑
C∈N
λCw
1(C),
∑
C∈N
λCw
2(C)} ≤ min{w1(N), w2(N)} = w(N),
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where the second inequality follows from the additivity of the TU-games derived from w1
and w2. If one of the balancing weights is negative, say λD, then assume without loss of
generality that w(D) = w1(D). We have that∑
C∈N\{D} λCw(C) ≤ min{
∑
C∈N\{D} λCw
1(C),
∑
C∈N\{D} λCw
2(C)}
≤ min{w1(N) + λDw1(D), w2(N) + λDw2(D)} = w(N) + λDw(D).
We next compute the Core C(N,w). It is immediate to verify that w1, w2 ∈ C(N,w),
as well as all convex combinations µw1 + (1−µ)w2, where λ ∈ [0, 1]. Choices for µ below 0
or above 1 lead to allocations outside the Core. We show next that C(N,w) is contained in
a 1-dimensional space, leading to the characterization of the Core of (N,w) as the convex
hull of w1 and w2.
Let x ∈ C(N,w). Since x(N) = w(N), we have that
x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 = 8. (2)
Since w({1, 2, 3}) = 6 and w({4, 5}) = 2, we find that
x4 + x5 = 2. (3)
It holds that
x3 + x4 = 3, (4)
x2 + x3 + x5 = 6, (5)
since w({1, 2, 5}) = 5 and w({3, 4}) = 3, and w({1, 4}) = 2 and w({2, 3, 5}) = 6, respec-
tively. Since (2)–(5) are four independent equations in five unknowns, we have shown that
the Core of (N,w) is contained in a 1-dimensional space.
Consider x¯ ∈ WSC(Γ). By Theorem 4.4 it holds that x¯s ∈ Γs for all s ∈ S. Moreover,
there is no C ⊂ N and allocation xC such that xCs ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S, and ui(xi) >
ui(x¯i) for all i ∈ C. Suppose there are states s, s′ ∈ S such that x¯4s 6= x¯4s′ . Take C = {4, 5}.
Since x¯4s + x¯
5
s = 2 for all s ∈ S, it holds that
xCs¯ := (
1
6
∑
s∈S
x¯4s,
1
6
∑
s∈S
x¯5s) ∈ C(Γs¯, C), s¯ ∈ S.
Because players 4 and 5 are strictly risk-averse, we have that u4(x4) > u4(x¯4) and u5(x5) >
u5(x¯5), a contradiction to x¯ ∈ WSC(Γ). Consequently, it holds that x¯4s and x¯5s are inde-
pendent of s.
17
We define α ∈ [0, 2] to be equal to x¯4s. Since C(Γs) is the convex hull of w1 and w2 up to
the permutation pis, we find that x¯
1 = (2−α, α, 3−α, 1 +α, 1 + 2α, 5− 2α). Moreover, x¯2
and x¯3 are identical to x¯1, up to a permutation. For C = {1, 2, 3}, we define the allocation
xC by xCs = (2, 2, 2) for all s ∈ S. It is easily verified that (2, 2, 2) ∈ C(Γs, C) for all s ∈ S.
Since the players in C are strictly risk averse, we have that ui(xi) > ui(x¯i) for all i ∈ C.
By Theorem 4.4 this contradicts x¯ ∈WSC(Γ).
We have shown that WSC(Γ) = ∅.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced uncertainty into transferable utility games. Since in
reality most surplus sharing decisions are made under uncertainty, this is a natural and
important extension. It is not straightforward though, how to define an appropriate core
concept for this stochastic setting. In this paper we consider allocations that are stable
in the absence of commitment possibilities. These requirements lead to the notion of
credibility. A credible deviation is self-enforcing in the sense that a coalition can credibly
deviate from a given allocation if no sub-coalition ever has a credible counter-deviation.
These considerations lead to the definition of the Weak Sequential Core.
We have an easy characterization of the Weak Sequential Core. All allocations in the
Weak Sequential Core belong to the Core of the transferable utility game played after
the resolution of uncertainty. Moreover, no coalition can block an allocation in the Weak
Sequential Core ex ante by means of an allocation that belongs to the Core of all the
ex post games reduced to the coalition. This property facilitates the application of the
concept and the proof of its non-emptiness. We show that convexity of the ex post games
is sufficient for the non-emptiness of the Weak Sequential Core, but that convexity cannot
be weakened to permutational convexity or exactness.
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